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Rosenthal: Rosenthal: Expanding Restrictive Covenants

EXPANDING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
Tishomingo Property Owners Association v. Cronin'
In 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court issued a significant opinion in the
law of restrictive covenants. The brevity of Lake Tishomingo Property Owners Association v. Cronin2 is deceiving in that the case concerns issues that
have been debated by courts and legal scholars for many decades.
Lake Tishomingo Subdivision is a high-quality residential area. 3 The
subdivision was developed and constructed by Lake Development Enterprises,
Inc. (hereinafter "LDE") in the late 1940s. 4 Deeds to the subdivision lots
included restrictions "denominated... as covenants running with the land."'
The restrictions provided for an annual assessment "not to exceed fifty-five
cents per [lake]front foot" to cover maintenance expenses of the common
6
areas, over which LDE retained title.
In 1969, several property owners brought a class action against LDE,
claiming that LDE had misused funds and failed to properly "maintain the
1. 679 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 854. The subdivision "consist[s] of a 120 acre man-made lake
surrounded by approximately 930 lots." Id.
4. Id. The subdivision was originally platted in 1948 in plat book 9 at p. 61
of the land records of Jefferson County, Missouri. Respondent's Brief and Argument
at 2, Lake Tishomingo Property Owners Ass'n v. Johnson.
5. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 855.
6. Id. The common property included roads, parkways, the lake, and a dam.
The specific provision read as follows:
As a part of the consideration for the sale of this lot, GRANTOR shall
have the right to assess the owner of this lot after August 1, 1949, and each
succeeding August 1st thereafter, such sum as GRANTOR shall deem necessary for the upkeep and maintenance of the Dam, Roads, and other improvements, provided, however, that no assessment for any one year shall
exceed the sum of fifty-five cents ... per front foot, and further provided
that the assessment as levied each year shall be and become a lien without
filing of suit or legal procedure to establish such lien on said lot if not paid
within thirty days after August 1st of the year in which the assessment is
made.
Id. at 855 n.4. The custom in Jefferson County, at the time the restrictions were
platted, was for the surveyor who platted the subdivision to prepare the restrictions.
The customary restrictions of the time did not contain amendment or modification
provisions. Respondent's Supplemental Brief and Argument at 37, Lake Tishomingo,
679 S.W.2d 852.
1077
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subdivision's dam and roads." ' 7 The suit was settled, and a consent decree
was approved by the court and entered as a final judgment." The decree
changed the original subdivision covenants in three ways. First, Lake Tishomingo Property Owners Association (hereinafter "LTPOA") was established to serve as trustee for the lot owners. LTPOA assumed all the "rights,
powers and obligations" of LDE as the original grantor. 9 Second, LDE was
required to transfer title to the common property to LTPOA. Third, the
court inserted a provision allowing future modification of the original restrictions. 10 The decree went unchallenged until this suit."
This dispute arose because of the need to dredge the lake. 12 Estimates
by an engineering firm placed the cost of the dredging operation at "approximately $170,000."' ' The annual assessment could not cover the cost of
the operation. In response to this problem, LTPOA's Board of Directors
7. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 855. This case, entitled Dortch v. Lake
Dev. Enter., was presented in the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis in Cause No.
81690-E (1969). Respondent's Brief and Argument, supra note 4, at 2.
8. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 856. "The applicable venue statutes
place[d] jurisdiction over the case with the Circuit Court of Jefferson County." Id.
at 855 n.6. "Consequently, though the [St. Louis] [Court purported to approve the
decree, it labeled substantial [parts] of it as 'advisory only."' Id. at 856. A new class
action was filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. Id. The cause entitled
Dortch v. Lake Dev. Enter., was presented as Cause No. 41728, Division 11 (1978).
Respondent's Brief and Argument, supra note 4, at 3. The suit was substantively
identical to the St. Louis case. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 856.
Notice of settlement was mailed to all property owners. This notice informed
the lot owners that the decree was binding unless objected to within thirty days. No
objections were filed. Id. There were discussions regarding the litigation at an association meeting. This association was open to all property owners. A copy of the
decree was posted in the community center. Respondent's Brief and Argument, supra
note 4, at 20, 22.
The property owners were represented by Albert Beyer in both actions. Lake
Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 856. Mr. Beyer was the appellant in the later actions.
See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
9. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 856.
10. Id. This provision allowed for:
changes in, or additions to, the said subdivision restrictions ... [upon approval] by a simple majority of the votes cast at an election wherein each
lot owner in the subdivision shall be entitled to cast one vote for each ten
(10) front feet of lot owned by him, but not less than five (5) nor more
than ten (10) votes per platted lot. (Said changes or additions may be for
the purpose of assessments, extension of the restrictions, and other matters
consistent with the purposes of the subdivision and the trust ....
Id. at 854.
11. Id. at 856.
12. Id. at 854. "There [was] no substantial dispute [over] the seriousness of
the problem." Id. "The lake was filled with sediment' and sand rendering portions
thereof unusable." Respondent's Brief and Argument, supra note 4, at 18.
13. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 854.
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called a special election of the lot owners, as allowed under the consent
decree, to amend the original covenants to allow a "one-time special assessment of $2.60 per [lake]front foot."'1 4 The amendment passed by the amount
required pursuant to the decree, "a simple majority of the votes cast."' 5
"Respondent [LTPOA] filed ...

suit in 1978 against [the] property

owners who had failed to pay the special assessment."' 16 LTPOA proceeded7
to trial against the few property owners who would not pay the assessment.'
The question before the court was whether the consent decree properly
amended the restrictions so as to allow modifications to the original covenants. 8 Defendants contended that the court was "powerless to amend or
reform the original covenants ...

so as to increase the original burden on

the covenanted land."' 19 The trial court found for LTPOA and "ordered
' 20
enforcement of the [special assessment] liens."
In addressing the appellants' contentions, the Missouri Supreme Court
stated, "It is undisputed that the special assessment was not authorized by
14. Id. The proposition read as follows:
The restrictions applying to Lake Tishomingo Subdivision of Jefferson
County, Missouri, said subdivision being as shown in Plat Book 9 at Page
61 of the Jefferson County Land Records, are amended by adding thereto:
'The Board of Directors of Lake Tishomingo Property Owners Association
are authorized to make a special assessment of Two Dollars and sixty cents
($2.60) per front foot to be levied by the said Lake Tishomingo Property
Owners Association upon the owner or owners of each Lot in said subdivision which is subject to the annual maintenance assessment provided however that each lot shall, in making said assessments, be considered as having
not less than fifty (50) front feet nor more than one hundred (100) front
feet; special assessment to be made on or about August 1, 1976, and one
time only, which special assessments shall be in addition to the annual
assessment for maintenance and upkeep and said special assessments herein
referred to shall be a lien and shall be collected in all manner as though
they were the annual assessments for upkeep and maintenance and the funds
obtained by said special assessments are to be expended by the Lake Tishomingo Property Owners Association for the purpose of cleaning Lake Tishomingo of silt, weeds and other debris; by mudcat dredge equipment leased
as per Engineers Report on the Lake Study.'
Id. at 854 n.2 (emphasis added). An election notice was published for several weeks,
and there were three open meetings concerning the election. Respondent's Brief and
Argument, supra note 4, at 20-21.
15. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 854. Out of 4913 possible votes 2904
were cast; 1976 in favor and 928 against. This vote represented the 246 property
owners who voted in the election; 163 voted for the special assessment; 83 voted
against it. Id.
16. Id. at 854-55.
17. Id. The defendants included Albert Beyer, the attorney who originally
obtained the consent decree for what was to become LTPOA, and four of Beyer's
relatives.
18. Id. at 853-56.
19. Id. at 856.
20. Id.
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the covenant restrictions contained in the original indenture and no provision
in the original covenants permitted their subsequent modification." 2' The
court summarized the issue presented by the case as "whether a consent
decree, entered as a final judgment... which amended the original covenants
so as to permit special assessments [could be] enforced against [the] property
owners."22
The court agreed with the appellants that the court in the prior action
was "powerless to . .. reform the original covenants," finding that neither
fraud nor mistake were alleged or proven in the Lake Tishomingo proceeding.23 The court found, however, that the other parts of the consent
decree making LTPOA trustee and conveying title to the common properties
to LTPOA were accepted by all parties and were valid. 24
The court denied that the lower court had the ability to modify the
restrictions. The court held, however, that under these facts the equitable
obligation of the appellants to pay the lien could not be disputed, stating
"[w]hile the Court is powerless to reform or amend the original covenants,
we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, when compared to the cost of the
dredging operation, the assessment permitted by the original covenants was
tantamount to no assessment at all."'-5 The court concluded that the assessment "voluntarily" paid by most lot owners appeared fair and equitable
stating "our sense of fairness and justice compels us to enforce the clear
equitable obligation of appellants to bear their share of the costs necessary
for preserving the common property essential for continuation of the subdivision. '"26
Nationally and statewide, the law of restrictive covenants has undergone
a great deal of change spanning many decades. In Gardner v. Maffitt,27 the
Supreme Court of Missouri stated that restrictions are "in derogation of the
fee" and should be narrowly interpreted. 28 Generally, Missouri courts enforce
21. Id. at 853.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 856. The court implicitly approved either fraud or mistake as adequate ground for reform. See infra note 46.
24. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 857.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 335 Mo. 959, 74 S.W.2d 604 (1934).
28. Id. at 965, 74 S.W.2d at 607; see, e.g., Steve Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405
S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1966); Mathews Real Estate Co. v. National Printing & Engraving
Co., 330 Mo. 190, 48 S.W.2d 911 (1932); see also Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535 (1956). In Jones, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
noted: "[R]estrictions on the use of land are not favored ... because they are an
interference with an owner's free and full enjoyment of his property; nothing will be
deemed a violation of a restriction that is not in plain disregard of its express words."
Id. at 272, 120 A.2d at 537. The Jones court further stated that restrictions interfere
with free use of property and should not be "extended or enlarged by implication."
Id. "Every restriction will be construed most strictly against the grantor and every
doubt and ambiguity in its language resolved in favor of the owner." Id. at 272, 120
A.2d at 537-38.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss4/7
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restrictive agreements in residential land, "avoid[ing] narrow . . . constructions ... [and interpretations by] endeavor[ing] to ascertain the actual intention of the parties." 29
Missouri's change in attitude toward restrictions parallels the increased
usage of these covenants. "[I]n the past only certain classes of covenants,
[particularly] those in leases and those concerning party walls ... [were] of
great importance to property owners. " ° "[With the growth of cities and
the ... crowded conditions of modern life, the desire of home owners to
secure desirable home surroundings ... led to a demand for land limited
entirely to development for residen[tial] purposes. ' 31 Restricted residential
32
property is now prevalent throughout the country.
There are two types of covenants that run with the land. Those "that
run under doctrine[s] developed in the English common law courts of Common Pleas and King's Bench are known as covenants running at law or...
'real covenants.' 33 The second type runs under doctrines* originating in
equity from Lord Chancellor Cottenham's Tulk v. Moxhay3 4 decision.3 1 "Re36
cent court decisions rarely turn upon real covenant doctrine."
29. Scurlock, Missouri Law of Land Agreements Which Run with the Fee,
23 U. KAN. C. L. Rnv. 3, 29 (1954). When the language is clear, however, "its
meaning ... must be given effect without consider[ing] extraneous factors." Id. at
29-31.
30. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH
LAND" INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROFITS, EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS, AND RENTS

170 (2d ed. 1947).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33.

R.

CUNNINGHAM, W.

STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY

468 (1984) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHrMAN].
34. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). This landmark decision, creating
the second category of restrictions, involved a covenant to maintain the property as
"a square garden and pleasure ground ... in neat and ornamental order." Id. at
775, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1143. The land passed to the defendant whose purchase deed
contained no similar covenant, but who admitted to having purchased with notice of
the covenant. Id. The court stated, "[T]he question is, not whether the covenant runs
with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner
inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which
he purchased." Id. at 777-78, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1144. The court held that when a
restrictive covenant is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with
notice of that covenant "can stand in a different situation [than] the party from
whom he purchased." Id.
35.

CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 468, 485-86. Tulk

v. Moxhay brought the principles of equity into the field of agreements that run with
the land. Scurlock, supra note 29, at 4.
36. CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK & WHrrMAN, supra note 33, at 487. The law of
equitable restrictions is generally applicable except in two situations: when money
damages are sought (which equity normally will not give and, in "a few jurisdictions,
where courts will not enforce affirmative covenants in equity." Id. If the requirements
for running have been met, Missouri courts will enforce affirmative covenants or
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In Lake Tishomingo, the Court cited Weatherby Lake Improvement Co.
v. Sherman7 for support of the equitable obligation principle. In that case,
the deeds to the subdivision did not contain restrictions regarding privileges
or responsibilities, such as maintenance, in connection with the lake, nor was
there a homeowners association provision. 8 Weatherby Lake Improvement
Company was incorporated by property owners.3 9 The right of the company
to levy assessments was at issue in Weatherby Lake.
In Weatherby Lake the lower court found it "fair and equitable that all
of the owners contribute ... their fair and proportionate share" to the
Improvement Company for the general maintenance and repair of the lake
property commonly owned. 40 The right of the company to make yearly assessments against all property owners was upheld by the lower court, not-1
4
withstanding the fact that the original restrictions lacked any such provision.
Appellants in Weatherby Lake unsuccessfully challenged the validity of
the court authorized assessment provision. Appellants also argued that the
burden of a later special assessment voted in by the company's board of
directors was not equitably distributed. 42 The court quoted a 1918 Missouri
Supreme Court decision on this point that stated:
It is true exact equality in apportioning the burdens of improvements is
beyond human wisdom, and no heed will be given complaints against a rule
which approximates justice as nearly as reasonably may be. Exceptional cases
of hardship in the natural and ordinary application of a principal [sic] of
and just must be borne as one of the imperapportionment generally fair
4
fections of human things. '
covenants to pay money. See Scurlock, supra note 29, at 21. Although there has been
much debate over whether a promise to pay an assessment or dues runs, because of
its affirmative nature, courts today are in agreement that those covenants do run.
See, e.g., Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir.
1960); Kell v. Bella Vista Property Owners Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651,
653 (1975); Annotation, Covenants as Running with the Land, 68 A.L.R.2D 1022
(1959) (covers affirmative covenants running with the land). "While cases from a few
American jurisdictions contain language indicating the adoption of the English rule
that the burdens of covenants, affirmative or otherwise, do not run at law, except
as between landlord and tenant, it is the general rule in the American courts that
covenants which otherwise satisfy the requirements of intention [and] privity, and
[which] 'touch and concern' do run, both at law and in equity, both as to benefit
and burden." Id. at 1026-27. Whether the burden is affirmative or negative is seldom
referred to at all. Id.
37. 611 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
38. Id. at 328.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 328-29. The court justified this decision by declaring that all the
landowners had easements for the use of the lake and its facilities. Id. at 328.
41. Id. at 328-30.
42. Id. at 332.
43. Commerce Trust Co. v. Blakely, 274 Mo. 52, 59, 202 S.W. 402, 404
(1918).
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The Weatherby Lake court concluded that as long as an equitable method
was devised for distributing costs of repairs, courts should not second guess
44
the amounts levied against the property owners.
The majority's reference in Lake Tishomingo to Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v.
Spain45 is one disturbing aspect of the Lake Tishomingo case. Although Lake
Wauwanoka is cited for its proposition that reformation or amendment of
covenants is permissible only upon proof of fraud or mistake 4 6 other language in the case appears to be in direct conflict with Lake Tishomingo, yet
this part of Lake Wauwanoka goes without mention.
Lake Wauwanoka involved a class action to amend the method of changing the applicable restrictions.47 The court denied the relief requested but did
increase the amount of the assessment. 48 Alleging the increase was insufficient
because of changed conditions, the appellant requested the court to order an
amendment.4 9 The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
stating:
The judicial function is a limited one and is not empowered to answer all
of the 'political' and social problems that beset a community. We have no
more business amending the restrictive covenants and setting assessments
than we do passing legislation and levying taxes. Separation of powers and
limitations of authority are vital to the maintenance of our system. Government by judiciary would be an unwarranted and violent intrusion into
the local political affairs of this lake community and the private property
interests involved. The resourceful people of Lake Wauwanoka must find
their answer in private contract, voluntary association, and the political
process. The court must not trespass this domain."
The Lake Wauwanoka court observed that the "[a]ppellants focus[ed] their
arguments on the trial court's jurisdiction to grant the relief requested...
[which] rest[s] on the abstract principle that the remedies of equity are plastic
and may be molded to meet the needs of justice. ' 51 The court disagreed with
44. Lake Weatherby Improvement Co. v. Sherman, 611 S.W.2d 326, 332 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980).
45. 622 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
46. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 856 (citing Lake Wauwanoka, 622 S.W.2d
at 314). "Covenants in a deed are essentially promises and, as such, are only reformed
upon proof of fraud or mistake." Lake Wauwanoka, 622 S.W.2d at 314. Without
fraud or mistake, the clear and explicit language of a covenant limits the court's
authority. "The court may not rewrite the agreement." Id.; see also Grantham v.
Rockhurst Univ., 563 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
47. Lake Wauwanoka, 622 S.W.2d at 310.
48. Id. at 310-11. The amount was increased by twenty cents to seventy-five
cents per front foot. Id. at 311.
49. Id.
50. Id.at 311 n.5.
51. Id.at 312.
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appellants' contention that a change in conditions furnished the necessary
ground for modifying the method of changing the restrictions, calling such
52
a remedy a "novel" equitable remedy.
It could have been argued in Lake Tishomingo that the original indenture
provided for an assessment for the upkeep of the improvements, 53 which had
become impracticable without awarding the amount allowed. This argument,
however, failed in Lake Wauwanoka where it was argued that the covenants
"should be construed in light of general language contained in the original
indenture which state[d] the purpose of the indenture [was] to maintain the
54
subdivision as a high [quality] ... area.

The Lake Wauwanoka court found that the language of the covenant
was "clear and unambiguous" as to the responsibilities and rights of the
original grantor, grantees, and successors.5 5 Therefore, the court found that
judicial modification was not allowed.5 6 It would similarly be very difficult
in the Lake Tishomingo case to argue that the original covenants were vague
57
regarding the authorized assessment.
The case of Lakeland Property Owners Association v. Larson58 involved
a deed which contained a provision authorizing changes of the covenants by
a majority vote of the lot owners in the subdivision. 9 Under this provision,
a majority adopted a provision permittng the property owners association to
assess dues, "the nonpayment of which would [create] a lien upon the property.,, o
In an action by the Association for nonpayment, the lower court held
that the majority of lot owners could not enact new covenants. 61 The lower
court stated that "the covenants ...

were not changes in the original cov-

52. Id. The court found that the appellants were incorrectly attempting to
analogize those cases in which the court, in equity, recognized changed conditions

and either refused to enforce the covenants or declared them void. See, e.g., Gibbs
v. Cass, 431 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (refused to enforce the covenants);
Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166, 44 S.W.2d 857 (1931) (declared the covenants
void).

53. See supra note 6.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Lake Wauwanoka, 622 S.W.2d at 313.
Id.
Id.
The provision at issue specifically states that no assessment for any one

year shall exceed the sum of fifty-five cents per front foot. Lake Tishomingo, 679
S.W.2d at 855 n.4. Furthermore, recitals of the fact that the assessment is for upkeep
of the subdivision are not generally considered part of the agreement and cannot be

used to broaden or change unambiguous and explicit restrictions. Vinyard v. St. Louis
County, 399 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
58. 121 Ill. App. 3d 805, 459 N.E.2d 1164 (1984).

59. Id. at 807, 459 N.E.2d at 1166.
60. Id.
61.

Id.
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enants but rather entirely new and different in character .... [Therefore
... the Association had no power to make a binding assessment on the
defendant as he had not agreed to be bound by the terms thereof. ' 62 The
court concluded, "Where a deed contains restrictive covenants but also permits their future alteration, the language employed determines the extent and
scope of that provision.

'63

The Lakeland court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the addition of the assessment provision was an unacceptable addition of a new
provision. The court stated that it is not the function of the courts to approve
the addition of provisions merely to serve equitable goals, but that courts
should endeavor to construe deeds "to give effect to the . . . intent of the
parties ... [when] the covenant was made.'' The Association in Lakeland

argued that the assessment provision was not new in effect because the land
to be maintained included easements for property owners' use. 6 The court
recognized that under Illinois law, the easement owner has a duty of maintenance but did not allow the theory to be used at trial.66 In Illinois, apportioning the repair costs of an easement is based on actual "use" of the
easement.6 7 The easement maintenance theory was not addressed in Lake
68

Tishomingo.

In holding that the voluntary assessment made and honored by the
majority of property owners was equitably enforceable in Lake Tishomingo,
the Missouri Supreme Court left many questions unanswered. Although under the Lake Tishomingo fact situation the conclusion reached by the court
62. Id. at 808, 459 N.E.2d at 1167. The court stated further that in interpreting

restrictive covenants the object is to effectuate the intent of the parties at the time
the covenant was made. Id. at 809, 459 N.E.2d at 1168.
63. Id. at 810, 459 N.E.2d at 1169. The court reasoned that the language
permitting changes of the covenants was directed at changes of existing covenants,
not the adding of new covenants. Id.; see also Van Deusen v. Ruth, 343 Mo. 1096,
125 S.W.2d 1 (1938) (per curiam) (provision in agreement that any restriction might
be modified, amended, released, or extinguished did not authorize any new or additional restrictions to be added, but only authorized existing restrictions to be made
less harsh or entirely extinguished). But see Hening v. Maynard, 227 Va. 113, 313
S.E.2d 379 (1984). A restriction creating a more restrictive neighborhood development
was impliedly validated by the court even though the covenants did not contain a
mechanism to modify or amend the covenants. Id. at -- , 313 S.E.2d at 381-82.
The Hening court, however, invalidated a modification which purported to waive the
assessment provision finding that unanimity was necessary to amend or terminate an
existing restriction. Id.
64. Lakeland Property Owners Ass'n v. Larson, 121 I11.App. 3d 805, 809,
459 N.E.2d 1164, 1168 (1984).
65. Id. at 810, 459 N.E.2d at 1169.
66. Id. at 811, 459 N.E.2d at 1169-70. The theory was not allowed because
it had not been raised at the trial court level.
67. Id. at 811, 459 N.E.2d at 1170.
68. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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is facially pleasing and intuitively fair, the Court provides little future guidance. Surely the court is not authorizing a carte blanche to similarly-situated
subdivisions to assess their neighbors against their will. Such a reading would
provide for an implicit ability to tax.
In the future, the question will probably come up in the context of an
extraordinary expense. If a majority has agreed to and honored an assessment
for a golf course, does this invoke the court's equitable obligation analysis?
A more complicated situation would be where a majority votes to erect a
new clubhouse when arguably all that is needed is a new roof. The solution
to this dilemma may only be avoided by including in the original restrictions
an express denial of any implicit powers.
In Lake Tishomingo, the viability of the subdivision was threatened. In
other situations, property owners could argue that to maintain their subdivision's high-quality standard, it is necessary to assess landowners for improvements such as tennis and racquetball courts because modem high-quality
subdivisions have these amenities. 69
The answer to this problem is found in the case. In discussing the dredging operation the Court states, "The evidence regarding the dredging operation reflects that it was both reasonable and necessary for the preservation
of the property value of the . . . lots in the subdivision." 70 This standard
provides a workable formula for courts to apply in this situation. A related
question involves a situation where there are no assessment provisions. Presumably, the court would follow a similar analysis under the guise of equity
if the viability of the subdivision were at stake.
A recent line of authority has developed in the New York courts that
holds when property owners buy lots within a private incorporated community, they, by their purchase, impliedly accept a corporate offer to provide
"services necessary to the well-being of [the] community." 71 The terms of
this implied in fact 72 agreemment include the "obligation to pay a propor73
tionate share of the cost of maintaining" the community.
69. This argument would not succeed if the sole basis for advancing it was
the general language in the covenants that the assessments are for the upkeep of the
high-quality subdivision. See supra notes 54, 57, and accompanying text.
70. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 857.
71. Sea Gate Ass'n v. Fleischer, 211 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1960); see, e.g., Tides
Property Owners Ass'n v. Paolillo, 56 A.D.2d 888, 392 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1977); Fieldston
Property Owners Ass'n v. Decorative Trends, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 685, 373 N.Y.S.2d
806 (1975), affl'd, 56 A.D.2d 525, 391 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1977), appeal dismissed, 42
N.Y.2d 960, 367 N.E.2d 652, 398 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1977); Patchogue Properties, Inc.
v. Eirillo, 54 Misc. 2d 863, 283 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1967); Tomkins Lake Estates Ass'n
v. Speisman, 51 Misc. 2d 488, 273 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
72. Sea Gate, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 781. Their obligations to the plaintiff-corporation, arose because they impliedly agreed to accept the "facilities and services,"
such as the police force, entrance gate, and street lights, which had been supplied by
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Although the leading case establishing this principle, Sea Gate Ass'n v.
Fleischer,74 was chiefly concerned with the issue of whether membership in
the corporate city's association affected the obligation to contribute,7 the
case contained strong language concerning the obligation to pay for upkeep
of the community development. The court stated:
The right of the Associaiton to exercise the control of the easements and to
maintain them in condition so that they can be mutually used and enjoyed
by all property owners has long been settled by the courts. Inherent in its
right of management is the right to maintain. Maintenance costs money.
Those who are entitled to enjoy
the easements are the ones who must pay
76
the cost of the maintenance.
See Gate is at least partially distinguishable from Lake Tishomingo. First
and most importantly, the provisions governing maintenance in Sea Gate contained no dollar limit, providing only that assessments could be levied for
maintenance. 7 7 Second, the nature of the services to be provided in Sea Gate
was different. There, the services included not only maintenance of the common property, but also protection through a police force, street lighting, and
other services provided in a private community," Third, the agreement binding the resisting members of the Sea Gate community was deemed to be implied in fact whereas, in Lake Tishomingo the court found that the deeds served
to bind the homeowners contractually to pay an assessment." Fourth, the easement theory was not addressed in Lake Tishomingo."
The overtone of Sea Gate, however, is clearly consistent with Lake
Tishomingo. When property owners agree to or accept the benefits of an
association that is obligated to maintain the common property they have a
right to enjoy, each has an obligation to pay a proportionate share of the
cost of maintenance. This principle may follow from straight easement law,
which has been utilized by analogy in the restrictive covenant situation in
Missouri. 81

the plaintiff as the accepted practice in the community for many years and that were
obvious to any buyer in the community. Id. at 779, 781.
73. Id. at 781.
74. 211 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1960).
75. Id. at 778-82. The court concluded that such membership bore no relationship to the right to enjoy the easements and thus did not affect their obligation
to support the maintenance required to the common properties. Id.
76. Id. at 778-79.
77. Id. at 779.
78. Id. at 781.
79. Id. at 781-82. This difference suggests that it should be easier to bind the
property owners in Lake Tishomingo, since they were contractually bound.
80. See infra notes 82-83 and accompnaying text.
81. Weatherby Lake Improvement Co. v. Sherman, 611 S.W.2d 327, 328-29
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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The original subdivision plat and later deeds to the individual lot owners
at Lake Tishomingo created easements in and the right to use common
areas. s2 LTPOA reasoned that no new obligation was created, because as
owners of the easements each lot owner had a legal obligation to participate
in the upkeep and repair of the common areas. 83 Although this theory was
not addressed by the court, the reasoning appears to apply with equal force
to the undisputed need to dredge the lake.
Sea Gate is more expansive than Lake Tishomingo in that the Sea Gate
court authorized the board of directors of the corporation to assess for all
necessary maintenance costs, whereas, in Lake Tishomingo the right of assessment was authorized only to the extent that subdivision viability was
threatened.8 4 Perhaps the Sea Gate court found the necessary flexibility for
this interpretation within the provisions governing assessments which, unlike
the comparable restrictions in Lake Tishomingo, were unspecific as to amount
and did not establish liens if unpaid. 5
Another solution to the inadequate assessment problem was rejected in
Lake Tishomingo. The method for modification provided by the consent
decrees would have certainly helped prevent a potential multiplicity of actions
in the future over the needed amendments to the outdated restrictions. Since
the provision for modification in the decree was disallowed, 6 all future problems concerning extraordinary expenses could produce separate litigation.
Judge Blackmar was distressed by the majority's blanket pronouncement of
the consent decree as void.8 7 Arguably, a consent decree procured through
a valid class action would be the equivalent of a unanimous agreement to
amend and should be upheld.88
82. Respondent's Supplemental Brief and Argument, supra note 6, at 24.
83. Id.; see also Larabee v. Booth, 463 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ind.Ct. App. 1984)
(the owner of an easement must generally bear the entire cost of maintenance, absent
an express agreement to the contrary); Lynch v. Keck, 147 Ind. App. 570, 582, 263
N.E.2d 176, 182-83 (1970) (easement created for the benefit of appellants, imposed
on appellants the duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair); McDonald
v. Bemboom, 694 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (where the owners of both
the dominant and servient tenements regularly use the easement, apportionment of
the cost of repairs and maintenance is fair, even though the agreement creating the
easement is silent with respect thereto).
84. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 857.
85. Punishment for nonpayment was denial of use of the streets, beach facilities, sewers, and other common property. Sea Gate, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 779. If
enforced, however, these provisions would obviously impair the rights to enjoyment
of the subdivision.
86. Lake Tishomingo, 679 S.W.2d at 856-57.
87. Id. at 857 (Blackmar, J., concurring in result). Blackmar's concern, however, might have been unwarranted in this case because it was not clear whether all
successors in title were parties to the consent decree. Id. at 856.
88. Steve Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. 1966) (restrictive
covenants may be "extinguished, modified, or changed by mutual agreement between
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Certainly the courts acting in equity should be allowed to amend provisions through a valid consent decree, especially in circumstances similar to
Lake Tishomingo, where notice was given to all lot owners of the substance
of the new provision and no objections were filed.8 9 This argument is
strengthened if the need for additional funds is apparent at the time the
decree is issued. A court, however, may not allow this approach because of
the potential supervision problems.
It is obvious that the fifty-five cent maximum assessment, which might
have appeared adequate in 1948, could not cover all contingencies. Requiring
property owners to pay a proportionate share of the cost to dredge the lake
seems fair. The operation was admittedly necessary to preserve the value of
their lots and the viability of their subdivision. Binding a property owner to
a provision that is not contained in the restrictions, however, is a novel
solution, and arguably contravenes the policy of certainty involved in establishing restrictions.90
BiRi't ROSENTHAL
all of those subject to the restrictions and all of those entitled to enforce them");
see also La Esperanza Townhome Ass'n v. Title Sec. Agency, 142 Ariz. 235, 689
P.2d 178 (1984).
89. See supra note 8. No objections were made for a period of approximately
seven years.
90. See, e.g., Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). There the
court invalidated a modification to a covenant which purportedly cancelled a prohibition on the operation of trades or businesses within the subdivision. Id. at 47981. The court held that unanimity is necessary to nullify the original covenants stating,
"persons who own property in a neighborhood subject to restrictive covenants are
entitled to rely on the covenants according to their terms, even if some of their
neighbors no longer desire their enforcement." Id. at 480-81. The restrictions in
Crimmins were set for twenty-five years, "followed by an automatic ten year renewal
unless modified by a majority of the owners." Id. at 479. It was not argued in
Crimmins that the modification provision could be exercised outside of the renewal
context.
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